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A case study in estimating avionics 
availability from field reliability data 
Abstract 
Under incentivized contractual mechanisms such as availability-based contracts the support service provider 
and its customer must share a common understanding of equipment reliability baselines. Emphasis is typically 
placed on the Information Technology-related solutions for capturing, processing and sharing vast amounts of 
data. In the case of repairable fielded items scant attention is paid to the pitfalls within the modelling 
assumptions that are often endorsed uncritically, and seldom made explicit during field reliability data analysis. 
This paper presents a case study in which good practices in reliability data analysis are identified and applied 
to real-world data with the aim of supporting the effective execution of a defence avionics availability-based 
contract. The work provides practical guidance on how to make a reasoned choice between available models 
and methods based on the intelligent exploration of the data available in practical industrial applications. 
Keywords: Field reliability; statistical data analysis; availability; avionics; case study 
1 Introduction 
As the economy shifts from valuing a product to valuing performance focus shifts to 
“service” availability1. Service availability is typically associated with incentivised 
contractual mechanisms known as availability-based contracts
2
. An example is Typhoon 
Availability Service (TAS), a £446m worth, long-term service contract aiming to ensure that 
the UK Royal Air Force’s operational requirements are met by their fleet of Eurofighter 
Typhoon fast jets
3
. Since the requirements to be met under such contracts are defined in terms 
of levels of field reliability to be achieved through an equipment support program, the service 
provider and customer must share an understanding of present reliability baselines
4
. 
Successful implementation of an availability-based contract requires that consensus is built 
around the metrics used to flow-through performance accountability across the organisations 
involved
5
. 
Recent trends such as eMaintenance in aviation
6
,
 
and Industrial Product-Service-Systems 
networks in manufacturing
7
 prioritise the collection and distribution of large data-sets via 
specific software architecture over the computation of reliability metrics from empirical data. 
Bringing forward the case of Rolls-Royce’s aero-engine fleet services management, Rees and 
van den Heuvel
8
 demonstrate that capturing and sharing vast amount of data is only one facet 
of decision-making for availability-based equipment support, since intelligent data analysis 
and a responsive organisational structure are also essential. 
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The research presented in this paper aims to contribute to the improvement of the 
understanding of reliability baselines for the effective execution of availability-based 
contracts by providing practical guidance on how to perform analysis on real-world reliability 
data obtained from defence avionics fielded repairable items. The work enables the analyst to 
make a reasoned choice between available models and methods based on an intelligent 
exploration of data that are typically available in most industrial applications. 
The paper continues with a brief overview of the literature, leading to the choice of a specific 
strategy for a meaningful reliability data analysis outlined in the materials and methods 
section. The findings from the application of such a strategy to a real-life case study are then 
shown and discussed. The paper closes by addressing the limitations of the proposed analysis, 
as well as the areas in which further research is needed. 
2 Literature overview 
A familiar way of understanding the reliability of a product that, upon failure, can be restored 
to operation is the relationship between the expected number of confirmed failure 
occurrences and metrics such as the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). MTBF is a 
maintenance performance metric common in both academic literature
9
, and industrial 
practice. For example, in Jane’s avionics, amongst the specifications of an Identification 
Friend-or-Foe (IFF) transponder for the Eurofighter Typhoon is “MTBF: >2,000 h”10. What 
is implicitly understood whenever product reliability is succinctly expressed as an MTBF is 
that the product lifetime is a random variable which is exponential-distributed, and that the 
probability per unit time that a failure event occurs at time t, given survival up to time t—
known as the hazard function
11—is a constant, and it is equal to the reciprocal of the 
MTBF
12
. 
The problems related to these assumptions are well-known. Blackwell and Hausner
13
 
demonstrate through a case study in defence avionics that uncritical acceptance of a constant 
MTBF developed in ‘laboratory’ conditions may hinder the identification of supportability 
issues for fielded items. Wong
14
 highlights that common assumptions regarding the shape of 
the hazard function can undermine decision-making, especially for electronic products, and 
discourage the use of engineering fundamentals and quality control practices. Pecht and 
Nash
15
 show that, historically, the rationale underpinning the use of the ‘exponential’ lifetime 
model for electronic devices is to protect reliability estimates against inaccuracies, however, 
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such a conservative approach is very likely to produce variable, and overly pessimistic 
assessments. 
Often, the alternatives to the exponential-distributed lifetimes are just as well chosen a priori 
rather than grounded on evidence obtained from empirical data. For example, in suggesting a 
mathematical expression for maintenance free operating period as an alternative way of 
modelling aircraft reliability Kumar
16
 assumes Weibull rather than exponential-distributed 
product lifetimes. Other models can be found in case studies concerning sectors such as oil 
and gas
17
, industrial equipment manufacturing
18
, microelectronics
19
, process industry
20
, and 
aviation
21, 22
. 
Another way is to formulate and test hypothesis regarding reliability models by applying 
statistical analysis to quantitative empirical data, rather than making model assumptions 
upfront. A wide range of techniques is available for this purpose
23, 24
. However, the 
employment of such techniques does not guarantee per se that a meaningful interpretation of 
empirical data is obtained. Evans
25
 warns that in the absence of a preliminary investigation of 
the meaning of the data impeccable mathematics is likely to lead to ‘stupid’ statistics. Hence, 
modelling decisions based purely on mathematical fit can be misleading
24
. 
One aspect often overlooked in the literature is how to analyse empirical data obtained from 
multiple copies of fielded repairable items, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of uncritically 
endorsing common assumptions. It has long been noted that reasons for the lack of 
understanding of basic concepts and simple techniques for repairable items can easily trigger 
a self-sustaining ‘vicious circle’ in which incorrect concepts lead to the adoption of 
ambiguous terminology and mathematical notation which conceal the incorrect concepts
26
. 
Ascher
27
 demonstrates with practical examples that most of the insidiousness of such a 
vicious circle lie in the analyst’s inability to appreciate the difference between a ‘set-of-
numbers’ deprived of its context and a ‘data-set’. Newton28 humorously points out that to try 
to fit a probability distribution to empirical data about repairable items seems to have become 
something of a ‘reflex reaction’ for reliability engineers, preventing them from realising that 
contradictory results may easily be obtained from the same data. These limitations are 
particularly evident in Baxter
29
 which, to the authors’ knowledge, is amongst the few works 
showing how to estimate availability from empirical data. 
Finally, the availability of sophisticated analytical capabilities within reliability software does 
not seem to provide sufficient grounds to assume that the analyst is adequately guided as to 
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how, why and when to employ such capabilities. This is evident in Sikos and Klemeš30, for 
example, who compare different reliability software without assessing whether the empirical 
data used for their comparison support the assumptions implicitly adopted upfront. 
3 Approach adopted 
Based on the overview outlined in the previous section, the key methodological aspects for 
the research presented in this paper are: 
 The adoption of non-ambiguous terminology, concepts and notation26; 
 The identification of a sound strategy for the statistical analysis of reliability data23. 
3.1 Terminology 
With regards to terminology, the term ‘failure’ itself requires some clarification. Yellman31 
denotes ‘functional failure’ as an item performing unsatisfactorily in delivering its intended 
output when demanded to function. This does not necessarily correspond to the detection of 
an undesired physical condition—a ‘material failure’. The distinction between functional and 
material failure is of practical relevance since metrics such as the MTBF may reflect 
confirmed ‘material failures’ only, not the total number of units returned for repair. As Smith4 
points out, metrics such as the MTBF would be inadequate within an availability-based 
contract, because to determine a service provider’s level of effort one should take into 
account the returned items for which the suspected malfunctioning could not be duplicated—
commonly referred to as No Fault Found (NFF). 
Another terminological aspect is related to whether the item the data refers to is repairable or 
nonrepairable. Such a distinction determines whether failure events are most appropriately 
described by a survival model or a recurrence model
11, 23
. The use of the term ‘failure rate’ to 
indiscriminately indicate “…anything and everything that has any connection whatsoever 
with the frequency at which failures are occurring” has in this regard traditionally caused 
great confusion
26, 28
. Ascher
27
 shows that the hazard function (or force of mortality) described 
earlier is a property of a time to a unique failure event (or lifetime) characterising a survival 
model, whereas the rate of occurrence of failure—ROCOF—is a property of a sequence of 
times to recurring outcome events characterising a recurrence model. Even when numerically 
equal, hazard function and ROCOF are non-equivalent. 
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For repairable items availability can be thought of as a ‘quality indicator’ that compares an 
item’s inherent ability to fulfil its intended function when called upon to do so (what could be 
performed, though may not be called upon) with some exogenously imposed requirements for 
performance levels
32
. Conceptually, there is a clear link between availability and the notion 
of ‘functional failure’. In practice, it may not be straightforward to express the desired 
outputs for equipment such as avionics
33
. Also, assets may take multkrykryiple states, and 
hence may be considered available if in many states providing they are able to perform above 
some quantifiable threshold
1
. Table 1 summarises different analytical formulations of 
availability taken from the literature
1, 12, 16, 32, 34–36
. All assume a priori the existence of a 
criterion to distinguish a state in which an item is performing ‘satisfactorily’. 
Table 1 HERE 
3.2 Strategy 
To the authors’ knowledge, Meeker and Escobar23 is amongst the few textbooks to point out 
the importance of explicitly identifying a sound strategy for the statistical analysis of 
reliability data. Settanni et al.
37
 outline one such strategy building on often overlooked good 
practices in analysing empirical data obtained from multiple copies of fielded items. Of 
particular relevance is the preliminary exploration of data to identify apparently trivial 
aspects which may undermine even a mathematically correct analysis. 
The strategy adopted for the research presented in this paper builds on such previous works, 
and is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. In the remainder of this paper, the strategy is 
illustrated through its application to the case study described below. 
Figure 1 HERE 
4 Case study 
The main aspects related to the case study considered in this paper are the following: 
 The provision of adequate context for the empirical data employed27, 28; 
 The creation of a data-set out of case-specific raw data. 
4.1 Case study setting 
The case study setting is the support provision for a piece of defence avionic equipment as 
part of an availability-based long-term service agreement
38
 (LTSA) for a modern fighter jet. 
The case study involves mainly two organisations, for confidentiality named “JetProv” and 
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“AvionicSupp” here. AvionicSupp manufactures and supports the piece of avionic equipment 
of interest, amongst other elements included in the avionic suite of the aircraft platform for 
which JetProv acts as a system integrator. JetProv also takes on responsibility for providing 
aircraft-related service availability with respect to the air force of a Country in virtue of an 
LTSA. The equipment is one of the Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) rolled up in the aircraft, 
whilst several replaceable modules are rolled up in each LRI. An LRI failure occurrence 
usually means that one or more of its modules have failed
39
. The repair roughly follows a 
typical logistic support scheme
40
: upon occurrence of failure, an LRI is removed from the 
aircraft, replaced—provided that a spare item is available in stock—and preliminarily 
examined at the airbase test facility to decide whether to ship it back to AvionicSupp for 
repair. Investigation at AvionicSupp may lead either to the identification of which modules 
have failed, or to an NFF. The main addition to this scheme is that LRIs of the same kind 
may belong to different customers of JetProv’s, with whom different support solutions may 
have been agreed. In the case of availability-based LTSA, JetProv’s performance 
requirement is flowed-through to AvionicSupp is in terms of an average repair turnaround 
time for the LRI. 
4.2 Data-sets 
The materials provided within the case study consist of excerpts from JetProv’s Failure 
Reporting Analysis & Corrective Action System—FRACAS41—as well as from 
AvionicSupp’s repair database, both in the form of MS Excel® spreadsheets. To provide the 
raw data with more context clarification was sought from personnel involved in the creation 
and usage of such data within the organisations. The relevant fields of the original databases 
were identified, leading to the creation of the data-sets shown in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 
with sensitive information masked or omitted, and discussed below. 
Table 2 HERE 
Table 3 HERE 
Table 4 HERE 
4.2.1 Items data-set 
The ‘items’ data-set includes 412 copies of an LRI for which records exist in both JetProv’s 
FRACAS and AvionicSupp’s repair database excerpts. In principle, this data-set should 
include the items of interest irrespectively of whether or not failure was experienced at all. In 
practice, this was not possible since all the information about individual items was obtained 
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from records capturing failure occurrences. Table 2 shows some of the items in the data-set; 
their manufacturing date; the date the observations ended; the batch the item belongs to, 
which reflects different development standards; and the customer the item is assigned to. 
Most information was obtained from the AvionicSupp’s repair database excerpt. Unlike single 
sample failure data obtained in test rig conditions, it is common for field data that the 
observation ceased before all possible failure events could be observed
24
. In this case, the 
date the observations ended corresponds to the date the last entry was logged in the 
FRACAS. This choice reflects the absence of better knowledge with regards to whether any 
item had been permanently discarded before such date. 
4.2.2 Failures data-set 
The ‘failure’ data-set provides recurrence data for multiple copies of a fielded repairable 
item. Table 3 shows some of the 1045 chronological logs of functional failures that have 
resulted in the removal of any copy of the LRI of interest. In the table, events logged on the 
same date for different items, or for different modules within the same item are reported on 
separate lines. Failure events occurring on the last recording date are omitted
42
. It is worth 
noting that an NFF occurring along with the detection of modules failure denotes a situation 
in which the malfunction originally suspected could not be confirmed and a different problem 
was detected, instead. Qualitative data in the free text fields of the FRACAS database were 
also explored to gain additional insight when data about which module failed or whether an 
NFF occurred were ambiguous, or absent. The values under the “recurrence times” and 
“interrecurrence times” headings were not part of the original data. Recurrence times were 
computed for each item as the difference between the date the event was logged and the 
item’s manufacturing date, which served as a proxy for the date the item was considered in-
service. Hence, in Table 3 the recurrence times denote the item’s age at failure. Different 
items enter the in-service phase at different calendar dates, hence they are not considered at 
risk of failing before such date. Such a situation is known as staggered entry
23
, or left-
truncation of lifetimes
11
. Due to the presence of staggered entries, the series of recurrence 
times in Table 3 is not magnitude-ranked. Interrecurrence times are computed as the 
difference between successive recurrences for a certain item. Finally, a value under the 
“censoring times” heading indicates that the next recurrence time for an item is known to be 
greater than a certain value, but is not known exactly because the observation terminates 
before any additional event is recorded. Such a situation is commonly referred to as right-
censoring, or Type I censoring
23
. Although often ignored in practice, the presence of 
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censorings has dramatic repercussions in the choice of the analytical formulation of a 
model
24
, and ignoring it may lead to overly pessimistic reliability estimates
28
. 
4.2.3 Repairs data-set 
Table 4 shows some of the 512 chronological logs of actions completed in response to the 
reported functional failures of any LRI included in Table 2, the ‘repair’ data-set. Unlike the 
failure data-set, whether one or more modules were replaced or an NFF arose is indicated in 
the repair data-set aggregately on a single line, in a free text field. Hence, multiple lines in the 
failure data-set have only one line as a counterpart in the repair data-set. Analysis of the free 
text ensured consistency between the repair data-set and the failure data-set with regards to 
which modules had failed when the information was ambiguous. The “Removal date” 
provided a proxy date for events occurred after the last record in the FRACAS database. 
The repair lead-time is computed as the difference between the outbound shipment date and 
the date the item is checked-in at AvionicsSupp (recording date). Most of the item-specific 
information contained in AvionicsSupp’s repair database is already shown in Table 1. 
4.2.4 Data-sets alignment 
The data-sets described above contain events about LRIs that are present in both JetProv’s 
FRACAS and AvionicSupp’s repair database. However, it was found that for certain LRIs 
some events were logged in FRACAS earlier than the manufacturing date. In the absence of 
additional information such a mismatch with regards to the events’ time origin reduced the 
number of useful records in the failure data-set to 867. After the update, the number of items 
for which at least one record existed in the failure data-set reduced to 362. 
Direct alignment between JetProv’s FRACAS and AvionicSupp’s repair database was 
operated mainly through a failure report key. When such a direct matching was not possible, 
correspondence was established indirectly by using a combination between an LRI’s removal 
date as recorded in the repair database, and its serial number as a proxy for the FRACAS log 
date for that item. Since the two excerpts covered different time periods some records could 
not be matched due to time cut-off. In particular, 270 records in the FRACAS were logged 
earlier than the first record in the repair database excerpt, whereas 116 records in the repair 
database where logged after the last event in the FRACAS excerpt. With the exclusion of 
time cut-offs, only 36 records in the FRACAS excerpt could be matched neither directly nor 
indirectly to any event in the repair database excerpt. The data-sets are further elaborated to 
obtain a layout which allows the visualisation, exploration and analysis of empirical data as a 
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sample pattern of a stochastic process of point events in time. Such a layout is shown in Table 
5 using a few items for illustrative purposes. 
Table 5 HERE 
Table 5 is obtained from Table 2 by complementing the use of spreadsheet with scripts 
created in the open-source statistical computing language R
43
. The first column in Table 5 
shows the chronologically ranked recurrence times obtained by superposing the recurrence 
times measured from the individual items’ time origin onto a common timescale. The time 
origin for such a timescale is the earliest date an item is fielded, hence the common timescale 
measures the time-on-study rather than the items’ age11. Each recurrence time corresponds to 
either a failure or an observation ceasing event, denoted respectively by 1 or 0 under the 
“status” heading. Hence, the times to non-failure recorded under the “censoring times” 
heading in Table 2 appear as additional lines in Table 5. Which item is affected by an event, 
at which age, and how long after the previous recurrence can be read column-wise. 
For example, the first failure occurs at 421 days, when “Item_016” (affected) is aged 244 
days, “Item_011” 268 days, “Item_014” 263 days etc. Observations for different items may 
start or stop at different times. At each recurrence the number of items observed, and hence 
be at risk of becoming a failure event, can be read under the “risk set size” heading in Table 
5. For example, 60 items are in the risk set when the first failure occurs, whilst such items as 
“Item_073”, “Item089” etc. have not been fielded yet. Depending on which timescale is 
chosen the risk set size, and the results of the analysis may change
11
. Multiple events 
recorded on the same date for the same item in Table 2 (the lines with zero interrecurrence 
times) are skipped in Table 5. Information about which module failed, whether an NFF arose, 
etc. previously recorded on different lines in Table 2 is recorded on a single line in Table 5. It 
corresponds to the categorical explanatory variables that can be read column-wise. Multiple 
events logged on the same date for different items qualify as simultaneous failures but appear 
as separate lines. Simultaneous logs can be treated as distinct since they may be due to 
coarseness in the timescale rather than genuine cascade-type failures
44
. 
5 Findings 
The findings concern such aspects as the exploration of failure data for trends, models fitting, 
and estimation of LRI availability. Each aspect is dealt with in a sub-section. 
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5.1 Failure data exploration 
The data layout presented in Table 5 allows exploring reliability data for structure, especially 
trends. Ascher
26
 has shown that “eyeball analysis” of a given set of times between successive 
failures for a repairable item may be sufficient to reveal that failures are occurring more, less 
or as frequently, depending on their order. Fitting a parametric lifetime distribution to such 
failure times assuming a priori they are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) will 
cause the loss of such information. 
In the presence of data obtained from multiple copies of fielded repairable items with 
staggered entries and censoring times one should use aggregated times and number of failures 
as shown in Table 5 to perform graphical and analytical tests for trends such as
28
: 
 Plotting aggregate number of failures against the aggregated times. In the absence of 
trend one would expect a plot that approximates a straight line; and 
 Performing a Laplace (or centroid) test on the sequence of aggregate times. A positive 
score, if significant, gives evidence that reliability deteriorates over time. 
By using the case-specific figures partially shown in Table 5, one obtains the plot shown in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 HERE 
A visual inspection suggests that the slope of the plot increases over time. One can verify 
such trend analytically by using the Laplace test. A possible formulation of the test score for 
𝑛 recurrence times 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 from the same time origin observed over a period of length 
𝑡𝑎, where 𝑡𝑎 ≠ 𝑥𝑛 is the following: 
𝑈 =
√12𝑛
𝑡𝑎
(
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
−
𝑡𝑎
2
) (1) 
From the layout partially shown in Table 5, and considering only unique recurrence times 
(𝑛 = 475 out of 624 failure events) one obtains: ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 231,279,108; 𝑡𝑎 = 833,526; and 
𝑈 = 6.35. The test score is positive, and provides evidence that the interrecurrence times are tending 
to become smaller – a situation colloquially known as a “sad” repairable item26. Such tendency is said 
to be statistically significant at 100𝛼% if 𝑈 exceeds the value 𝑧 such that 𝜙(𝑧) = 1 − 𝛼 2⁄ , where 
𝜙(𝑧) is the standard cumulative normal distribution function evaluated in 𝑧. In the case considered 
here 𝑈 > 𝑧 for 𝛼 = 0.05, hence the trend is significant. 
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Another graphical check for trends to plot autocorrelation coefficients between 
interrecurrence times at different time lags, known as correlograms
44
. For the case considered 
here, the coefficients are computed following Makridakis et al.
45
 up to 8 time lags, and are 
shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3 HERE 
Although it is not the case that all the coefficients are zero, as it would be expected from a 
series of random numbers, all the values lie within the critical values ± 1.96 √𝑛⁄ = ±0.899 
(𝑛 = 475) which seems to suggest ‘white noise’ data rather than a particular pattern. 
Walls and Bendell
44
 suggest performing similar data exploration for repair times, too. In 
principle, if considered as a set-of-number repair times can be treated analogously to failure 
times. Often, such terms as ‘failures’ and ‘repairs’ are used as synonyms to describe a generic 
event of interest
23
. In the case of repairs, recurrence times are the items’ ages at completion of 
each repair intervention. Hence, the time between successive recurrences is broader than the 
repair lead time. 
Censoring times were found to affect repair times, too. In particular, there were entries in the 
repair database for which a date of completion was not yet available. Hence, the repair lead 
times for these interventions were not known, except for being greater than the difference 
between the repair log date and the date the observation terminated. In the absence of specific 
examples in the literature, trend analysis was performed as shown earlier, but using repair 
completion times, where available, instead of failure times. The Laplace test score is 𝑈 =
−8.08 providing evidence of increasing repair times at 5% of statistical significance. 
To rule out other elements that may affect the gap between two consecutive repair completion 
events, the same analysis was also performed using the lead times only, rather than the entire 
time between consequent repair completions. The corresponding Laplace test score is 
 𝑈 = −2.46, still negative and statistically significant. 
5.2 Fitting models to data 
Options for fitting models to empirical data can be parametric or non-parametric in nature, 
depending on whether or not they embed assumptions on certain features of the population 
being studied
23, 24
. In the following sub-sections some of the options that are more appropriate 
for the case study are identified and applied with a practical outlook. For ease of exposition a 
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broad distinction is made between recurrence time models; interrecurrence time models; and 
regression models. 
5.2.1 Recurrence times models 
The preliminary data exploration suggests that, considering multiple copies altogether the 
LRI under investigation is a “sad” repairable item, hence, a model characterised by a non-
stationary (i.e., evolving over time) ROCOF should be fitted to the data
26, 27
. The main 
parametric and nonparametric alternatives for the statistical analysis of recurrence data where 
recurrence times may not be i.i.d.
 
are, respectively
23
: 
 A population’s Mean Cumulative recurrence Function—MCF; and 
 Point stochastic processes such as the Poisson process. 
To illustrate the implementation of such models, the data layouts for the item data-set and the 
failure data-set are expanded as shown in Table 6 and Table 7 using a few selected items. 
Table 6 HERE 
Table 7 HERE 
Table 6 presents additional columns compared to Table 2 which are necessary to estimate the 
parameters of a point stochastic process by numerical approximation, as shown later. Table 7 
uses the same timescale as Table 5 to reflect staggered entries, however, it focuses on the 
unique times at which failure or observation ending events occur. At each unique recurrence 
time (row) and for each item (column) it is indicated whether the item is observed and part of 
the risk-set and whether it is affected by the failure occurrence. 
Meeker and Escobar
23
 provide a detailed computational procedure to obtain a nonparametric 
MCF estimator as the expected number of failures across a population of repairable items 
observed from individual time origins until failure, along with 95% confidence bounds. 
According to the procedure, at each unique recurrence time, ranked by magnitude, one 
computes the mean of the distribution of failure events experienced by the items that are in 
the risk set at that time. The non-parametric MCF estimator is then obtained by summing up 
the sample mean number of events up to that time. The relevant results are shown on the 
rightmost side of Table 7.  
Whilst the MCF alone can be estimated using a spreadsheet, the computation of confidence 
bounds would be impractical in the presence of a large population of items. Hence the whole 
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procedure was framed as shown in Figure 4 and implemented as a script for the computing 
language R. 
Figure 4 HERE 
In the algorithm, the vectors ‘reported.events’ and ‘riskset’ correspond to the ominous 
columns in Table 7, whilst the matrices ‘status.matrix’ and ‘events.matrix’ refer to the 
columns under the headings ‘Items status’ and ‘Event occurrence per item’ in Table 7. 
Figure 5 shows graphically the estimated nonparametric MCF and 95% confidence envelope 
for the case considered here. 
Figure 5 HERE 
Since the model is nonparametric, to obtain a ROCOF one should divide the difference 
between the values taken by the MCF at successive times by the length of the time interval. 
Figure 5 also shows a parametric approximation which is typically recommended in the 
presence of trends: a non-stationary point stochastic process known as the Non Homogeneous 
Poisson Process—NHPP26, 44. 
One analytical formulation of the NHPP which is widely used in practice is the ‘power law’ 
NHPP, characterised by a non-constant ROCOF that is expressed as function 𝜈(𝑡, 𝜽) =
𝜆𝛽𝑡𝛽−1 of time t and a vector 𝜽 = [𝛽, 𝜆] of unknown parameters23. The particular situation 
considered here is one in which recurrence data are obtained from 𝑘 copies of an item; each 
item 𝑞 (𝑞 = 1, … , 𝑘) is observed continuously from time 𝑆𝑞 to time 𝑇𝑞; during such period 
each item experiences 𝑁𝑞 failures, each failure 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑞) occurring at a certain time 
𝑋𝑖𝑞. In such a situation Crow
46
 expresses the maximum likelihood estimators of a power law 
NHPP’s parameters ?̂? and ?̂? as the following set of equations: 
?̂? =
∑ 𝑁𝑞
𝑘
𝑞=1
∑ (𝑇𝑞
?̂?
− 𝑆𝑞
?̂?
)𝑘𝑞=1
 (2) 
?̂? =
∑ 𝑁𝑞
𝑘
𝑞=1
?̂? ∑ (𝑇𝑞
?̂?
ln𝑇𝑞 − 𝑆𝑞
?̂?
ln𝑆𝑞) − ∑ ∑ ln𝑋𝑖𝑞
𝑁𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑞=1
𝑘
𝑞=1
 (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) are not in a closed form, but can be solved numerically with the aid of 
the data layout in Table 6 via electronic spreadsheet. This requires that a value 𝛽∗ is 
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arbitrarily chosen for ?̂? on the rightmost side of equations (2) and (3). For example, 𝛽∗ = 1 
yields in our case ∑ (𝑇𝑞
𝛽∗ − 𝑆𝑞
𝛽∗)312𝑞=1 = 833,526; and ∑ (𝑇𝑞
?̂?ln𝑇𝑞 − 𝑆𝑞
?̂?ln𝑆𝑞) = 7,349,788.4
312
𝑞=1 . 
Considering that 𝑛 = ∑ 𝑁𝑞
𝑘
𝑞=1 = 624 and ∑ ∑ ln𝑋𝑖𝑞
𝑁𝑞
𝑖=1
𝑘
𝑞=1 = 5,003.2 one obtains ?̂?=1.25 form 
equation (3). Ideally, the difference between 𝛽∗ and ?̂? should be zero, but this might be 
unrealistic. Hence, the problem is to find a value 𝛽∗ > 0 such that the difference 𝑧 = ?̂? − 𝛽∗ is 
minimized subject to such a constraint as, for example 0 ≤ 𝑧 ≤ 0.000001. The value 
𝛽∗ = 2.012 ≅ ?̂? which satisfies the constraints is found iteratively by using the Solver 
embedded in MS Excel®. The estimate obtained is greater than one, consistently with the 
evidence of a “sad” item provided by the exploration of failure data for trend. Given ?̂?, one 
obtains ?̂? = 1.217 × 10−7 from equation (2). The expected (mean) number of failures over a 
time interval (0, 𝑡) is 𝐸(𝑁𝑡) = ?̂?𝑡
?̂?, and it is shown as a curve in Figure 5. The same analysis 
can be carried outdistinguishing between three different development standards (batches) of 
the LRI of interest, as shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 HERE 
In practical terms, the graphs shown in Figures 5 and 6 indicate the total number of functional 
failures resulting io a removal, that is experienced on average by an LRI over a certain time 
period. The underpinning function’s ROCOF is increasing which indicates that the time it 
takes, on average, an LRI to require an additional support intervention gets shorter the longer 
it has been in the field. This trend does not seem to by affected by the development standard a 
product belongs to. 
Crow
46
 provides a ‘goodness-of-fit’ statistic for the power law NHPP that is suitable when 
the observations start time is not zero for all the item’s copies the data are obtained from: 
 Identify at least 𝑚 = 3 time intervals, characterised in terms of upper and lower 
bounds 𝑇𝑗 = (𝑡𝑗, 𝑡?̅?) (𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑚), containing at least five total failure occurrences; 
 Compute the expected failures over each interval as 𝑒𝑗 = ?̂?𝑡?̅?
?̂?
− ?̂?𝑡𝑗
?̂?, where ?̂? and ?̂? 
are the estimated  parameters, and indicate the actual data number of failures as 𝑁𝑇𝑗;  
 Compute the statistics 𝑋2 = ∑ [𝑁𝑇𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗]
2
𝑒𝑗⁄
𝑚
𝑗=1  and compare it with the critical 
value of a Chi-distribution (e.g., via lookup tables). Typically, 𝑚 − 1 degrees of 
freedom and a level of 5% statistical significance are chosen. 
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For the case considered here a critical value of 𝑋2 =  5.20 is obtained as shown in Table 8.  
Table 8 HERE 
Its attained level of statistical significance, or p-value, from a Chi-distribution with 2 degrees 
of freedom is between 0.10 and 0.05, confirming the hypothesis that the observed values 
follow an NHPP with the estimated parameters. 
5.2.2 Interrecurrence time models 
As anticipated in Section 2, fitting parametric lifetime distributions is an appropriate way of 
modelling single sample data referring to items that fail only once, as in test rig conditions. 
However, this procedure is commonly applied to model repairable items, too, if there is no 
strong evidence against the hypothesis of i.i.d. failure times
47
. Although the empirical data 
considered here are characterised by the presence of trends, a complementary, distribution-
fitting is of practical relevance, especially for estimating availability
29
. Also, it has been 
demonstrated that under certain circumstances the hazard functions of traditional lifetime 
distributions can be used to model an NHPP’s ROCOF48. 
When modelling the reliability of electronic products Weibull distributions are a common 
choice
12
. However, to try to model the reliability of a repairable item by distribution-fitting 
makes sense only if interrecurrence times are being analysed, since this amounts to non-
repairable component analysis
28
. One way to fit a Weibull distribution is by graphical 
approach. The approach is based on magnitude-ranked interrecurrence times, and the 
estimation of their Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) to obtain the coordinates of a 
Weibull plot to which a straight line is fitted
28
. For the case considered here, there relevant 
values and statistics are given in Table 9, and plotted as shown in Figure 7.  
Table 9 HERE 
Figure 7 HERE 
Unlike recurrence data analysis, the risk set in Table 9 is not the number repairable items 
being observed, but a number of fictitious non-repairable items which is equivalent to the 
number of failure events. From the slope and intercept of the line shown Figure 7 the 
estimators for the distribution’s shape and scale parameter are found to be, respectively, 
?̂?graph = 1 0.9915⁄ = 1.02 and 𝜃graph = 𝑒
6.658 = 731.15. Another approach is to estimate 
the distribution’s parameter by maximum-likelihood. Venables and Ripley49 provide a robust 
algorithm to this purpose, which is available through the function ‘fitdistr’ in the MASS 
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package for the statistical computing software R. Due to the presence of censoring times, 
however, a modified version available in the “fitdistrplus” package50 has been used. The 
interrrecurrence times and status data in Table 9 provide the inputs for the algorithm which 
yields ?̂?mle = 1.17 and 𝜃mle = 1333.03. The empirical and estimated probability density 
function (pdf) and cumulative distribution function (cdf) are shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 8 HERE 
A similar procedure can be carried out for each module rolled up in the LRI. For example, the 
module with most occurrences, “module_02” has a rather short characteristic life, expressed 
by the scale parameter osrif the fitted lifetime distribution 𝜃mod_02 = 12.9 [days]. 
Finally, the lognormal distribution is often considered appropriate for modelling repair 
times
29, 34
. From the empirical data about repair lead times, the mean ?̂?mle = 3.55 and 
standard deviation ?̂?mle = 1.15 of a lognormal distribution were estimated by maximum 
likelihood using the “fitdistrplus” package for R. Figure 9 shows the empirical and estimated 
probability density function and cumulative distribution function. 
Figure 9 HERE 
The presence of censoring in the data prevents the straightforward application of testing 
procedures to assess the fit of the empirical data to the estimated distributions such as the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. Modified K-S procedures for censored data are available
51
, 
but only apply to the case in which censored observations are all greater than the largest 
observed value. In the absence of adequate alternatives, it is suggested to proceed by visually 
inspecting the empirical and theoretical cumulative distribution functions
50
. 
5.2.3 Regression models 
A common trait of the models discussed above is that the items the data is gathered from are 
deemed indistinguishable. Especially when a large number of items is available for analysis 
heterogeneities (e.g., in configuration, operating conditions etc.) are known to affect the 
reliability of each copy. Regression type of analysis is appropriate in such a situation, and is 
less affected than other methods by such special conditions of reliability analysis as the 
presence of censored data, and the arbitrary choice of lifetime distributions
52
. In particular, 
the Cox ‘Proportional Hazard’—CPH model is a semi-parametric regression model of 
survival analysis widely used in biometrics
49, 52
, with extensions that can be applied to the 
analysis of recurrent events
11, 49
 and hence, by analogy, to repairable items. A CPH model 
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determines how the hazard function varies from a common baseline between groups within 
the population being investigated by specifying explanatory variables that reflect the 
heterogeneous conditions under which data were collected. In the presence of variables the 
value of which may change over time for a given item—called time-dependent explanatory 
variables—an ‘extended’ Cox model, based on a layout in which each recurrence event is 
defined in terms of its ‘start’ and ‘stop’ time, is required11. For the case considered here the 
relevant explanatory variables are shown in Table 5. Some such variables, named ‘event-
specific’, are inherently time-dependent whilst other, named ‘item-specific’, are time-
independent. The recurrence times in Table 5 serve as the ‘stop’ times, whilst the ‘start’ times 
can be obtained for each event for a given item by retrieving the previous event’s recurrence 
time. Once the empirical data are suitably arranged a Cox model for recurrence events can be 
fitted via the “coxph” function provided with the survival package for R11, 49. By applying 
this procedure one obtains regression coefficients corresponding to each explanatory variable 
included in the model and, for each such coefficient, a p-value for testing its significance and 
an Hazard Ratio (HR) for measuring the strength of the association between variables. 
Statistically significant (p-values < 5%) associations were found for four modules 
(“module_02”; “module_06”; and “module_10”), one customer (“customer_07”), and the 
phases the failure event occurs (coded as 1 for the in-service stage and 0 for production). The 
estimated coefficients were, respectively: 𝛿mod_02 =  −0.383; 𝛿mod_06 = −0.398; 𝛿mod_10 =
−0.749; 𝛿mod_14 =  1.338; 𝛿customer_07 = 0.715; and 𝛿phase = −0.757. The interpretation of 
such coefficients for inherently time-dependent explanatory variables is based on their HR
11
. 
For example, the HR of the explanatory variable “phase” is 𝑒𝛿phase = 0.47, meaning that at 
any given time the hazard for an item which has not yet failed in-service (but may) is 
approximately 1 0.47⁄ ≅ 2 times the hazard for an item which has already failed in-service 
by that time. Similarly, the hazard for an item which has not yet experienced a material 
failure in “module_02” at a given time is 1 𝑒−0.383⁄ ≅ 1.5 times the hazard for an item which 
has already experienced it by that time. By contrast, the customer variable is time-
independent. Hence, the value 1 𝑒0.757⁄ ≅ 0.5 means that the hazard for other customers is 
0.5 times the hazard for “Customer_07”. 
5.3 Availability estimation 
The problem of determining whether a piece of equipment will perform its function at the 
instant it is required has been extensively considered theoretically
12, 36
. Since availability is 
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typically interpreted as the ratio of satisfactory operations to downtime, the most popular 
amongst the definitions given in Table 1 is static availability. Static availability is the limit of 
another function, called instantaneous or point availability also shown in Table 1.  
Baxter
29
 provides an example of availability estimation from empirical data by numerical 
evaluation of the following formulation of instantaneous availability: 
𝐴(𝑡) = ?̅?(𝑡) + ?̅?(𝑡) ∗ ∑ 𝐹𝑛(𝑡) ∗ 𝐺𝑛(𝑡)
∞
𝑛=1
 (4) 
where 𝐹(𝑡) is the distribution function corresponding to the interrecurrence times’ pdf; 𝐺(𝑡) 
is the distribution function corresponding to the repair lead times’ pdf; ?̅?(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) is the 
probability that the item functioned without failure up to time t.  
At the heart of equation (4) is an operation called Stieljes convolution, denoted by the 
operator “*”, of two distribution functions which yields the distribution function of the sum 
of the two underlying random variables. Superscript “n” in equation (4) denotes the n-fold 
recursive convolution of a certain distribution function. Baxter
29
 suggests using cubic splines 
approximations of the function to be convoluted. Ruckdeschel and Kohl
53
 provide a generic 
algorithm for R to execute the convolution between two distributions based on Fast Fourier 
Transforms. Although such concepts may sound familiar to the mathematically literate, it was 
felt by the authors that the implementation of such approaches, although still possible via 
“black boxes”, would have required dealing with theories which go beyond the scope of this 
paper. A more pragmatic approach to the evaluation of equation (4) described by Mullineux
54
 
and implemented as shown in Figure 10 was chosen. 
Figure 10 HERE 
The algorithm divides the abscissa into a series of intervals of equal width h (e.g., 1). It 
employs R built-in commands to evaluate the estimated pdfs and cdfs over the discrete 
timeline t thus obtained (e.g., for the Weibull distribution function such commands are 
“pwebiull” and “dweibull”, respectively). A subroutine named “deriv.approx(A)” is employed 
to approximate the derivative of a generic function 𝐴(𝑡) evaluated along t by numerical 
differentiation, that is, by computing the slope of a nearby secant line through two points. 
Another subroutine called “convolve.trapez(A, b)” performs the Stieljes convolution between 
two functions 𝐴(𝑡) and 𝐵(𝑡), formally expressed as 𝐴 ∗ 𝐵(𝑡) = ∫ 𝐴(𝑡 − 𝑢)
𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
. The 
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function 𝑏(𝑡) =
𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 is preliminarily obtained via the “deriv.approx(A)” subroutine already 
mentioned. Then, 𝐴(𝑡 − 𝑢) and 𝑏(𝑢) are evaluated and the results multiplied. Finally, the 
integral of the function defined by the sequence of numbers thus obtained is computed in a 
simplified way by approximating the area underneath the function as a trapezoid. Both 
subroutines are described concisely as algorithms in the Appendix. 
To evaluate equation (4) for the case considered here, the focus was on those subsets of the 
repair and FRACAS datasets that overlap. In such a way it was possible to associate each 
repair intervention on a certain item with the uptime that followed, measured as the 
difference between the outward shipping date and the next date a failure was logged in for 
that item. In this case, the interrecurrence times are identified with the uptimes only, not with 
the whole difference between two consecutive recurrence dates. Also, censored 
interrecurrence times arise in those situations in which a repair intervention is known to be 
completed beyond the last recorded event in the failure database, but before the last recorded 
event in the repair database. Finally, by focusing only on the matched failure and repair 
events it was possible to compute ‘empirical’ availability as the number of items no failed a 
certain number of days after each completed repair. 
Figure 11 shows the point availability function estimated applying the algorithm in Figure 10 
to the matched failure and repair data (solid line); the point availability function obtained 
from all the available data (dashed line); and the empirical availability at each ‘time after 
repair completion’.  
Figure 11 HERE 
When using the matched failure and repair data, the function 𝐴(𝑡) appears to remain close to 
its asymptote lim𝑡→∞ 𝐴(𝑡) ≅ 0.981 after roughly 502 days. When using all data, instead, the 
function settles down to a limiting value of 0.949 at roughly 2,424 days. The limiting value, 
or “static availability”, can be computed also directly in a relatively straightforward way once 
the estimated pdfs’ parameters are known.  
For example, knowing that the expected (mean) values of the estimated failure and repair 
times’ pdfs estimated in the previous section are, respectively, 𝜇1 = 1260.96 and 𝜇2 = 67.49 
then 𝐴static = 𝜇1 𝜇1 + 𝜇2⁄ = 0.949. Empirical availability is scattered, but most points seem 
to align between such theoretical estimates. 
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6 Discussion 
The implementation of a specific strategy for the analysis of empirical data obtained from 
fielded items is an often overlooked aspect. The theoretical grounds for such a strategy are 
touched in principle by nearly any reliability engineering handbook. However, in the 
presence of a limited number of practical examples and applications to real-life case studies it 
is not always clear how one should proceed when the incumbent ways to go about reliability 
data analysis do not apply. Such aspects range from organising empirical data in a suitable 
layout, through their preliminary exploration, to the identification and implementation of 
alternative formulations of a model to be fitted to the data. 
The importance of the data layout is seldom treated explicitly and in sufficient detail. 
Kleinbaum and Klein
11
 offer extensive discussion with regards to the survival analysis of 
recurrent events. Meeker and Escobar
23
 give examples for the non-parametric MCF 
estimator. An appropriate data layout accommodates the presence of censored data, including 
both right-censoring, and the staggered entry into service of different copies of an item. Such 
an aspect is often neglected when it comes to practical implementation since works make 
almost without exception the assumption that recurrence times are measured from a common 
origin. Newton
28
 is amongst the few authors demonstrating how insidious this can be. The 
“methods” section of this paper has dealt with obtaining ‘data-sets’ form the raw company-
provided data, rather than focusing directly on a ‘set-of-numbers’ deprived of context. 
The preliminary exploration of the empirical data is acknowledged as a necessary step to 
prevent the uncritical acceptance of the hypothesis that the sequence in which failure events 
occur is of no importance. The Laplace or centroid test is mentioned, amongst others, in most 
handbooks
23, 42
. Newton
28
 provides indication on how to proceed in the presence of multiple 
copies, staggered entries and censored data. In practical applications, however, whether a 
choice is made for modelling the reliability of a repairable item as an NHPP or by fitting 
some parametric distribution to recurrence data is not grounded on empirical data 
exploration. Either no test is performed on the available data
17, 22
 or, if performed, such tests 
typically lead conclude that no structure is identified
18, 47
. This results in a lack of practical 
guidance on how to interpret and follow up the results of preliminary data exploration. 
In the case considered here, evidence of trend was found. In particular, it seemed that failures 
were occurring at shorter intervals, and repairs completion at longer intervals. However, the 
two analyses were carried out on non-overlapping samples of data. Failures and repairs are 
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treated as two facets of the same coin—some “relevant” event—in the statistical analysis of 
recurrence data
23
. To the authors’ knowledge, they are typically not subject to separate 
analyses. In the absence of further guidance, it was chosen to fit a parametric recurrence time 
model, and a non-parametric recurrence time model to failure recurrence data only.  
Non-parametric recurrence times models such as the MCF estimator are seldom applied to 
case studies. An exception is Bumblauskas et al.
55
, who present a case study in electric power 
equipment. However, the use of a specific software package for reliability analysis does not 
allow a detailed discussion on how staggered entries were dealt with. Hence the choice was 
made here to implement the algorithm in Meeker and Escobar
23
 from first principles. The 
MCF plots were used to compare items from different design developments. Regardless the 
group the items belong to, evidence seems to be against reliability growth. The power-law 
NHPP was chosen as the parametric recurrence time model. Its most popular analytical 
formulations is a closed form which assumes a single item only
17, 26
. If multiple copies of an 
item are considered, it tends to be assumed they have the same observations’ start and end 
time
22
. In the case considered here, the non-closed form equations that apply in all other 
cases, which are characteristic of field reliability data, have been chosen, and numerically 
solved using resources available in common electronic spreadsheets. 
In practical terms, recurrence time analysis via MCF or power-law NHPP provides insights 
into good and poor performing items in the field that can be filtered by model years, 
development standard, production lot numbers etc. One may be interested, for example, in 
which model years within an installed base have performed well to identify best practices, or 
which ones performed poorly to identify whether a design review is needed. A word of 
caution, however, is necessary. A product design review might show increased reliability 
under the test rig conditions. Yet, as Figure 6 shows, it is not the case that product design 
reviews alone can be expected to affect the total number of support interventions demanded, 
on average, by an LRI once fielded. In such cases insight into the whole socio-technical 
support system including maintenance practices is necessary. For example, a previous case 
study employing interviews demonstrated that differences in the maintenance philosophy 
between different aircraft led to coding analogous LRI removal events differently, as an NFF 
in one case and as a repair in another, thus affecting the quantitative analysis’ results13. 
Due to their practical relevance, especially for availability estimation, modelling of failure 
times via parametric distributions could not be ignored here. Although robust algorithms to fit 
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the most common probability distributions to data are available, the presence of censoring 
times requires careful selection of which procedure to apply. Despite its importance, such an 
aspect remains mostly unaddressed in case studies where probability distributions are the 
model of choice for empirical data
18, 29, 47
. Also, the assessment of the goodness-of-fit of the 
estimate obtained considering censored times is still problematic, except for a particular kind 
of right-censoring which mostly occurs in test rig conditions. 
Semi-parametric regression models for recurrence data were also considered as an 
appropriate way to overcome the simplifying assumption that multiple copies of a fielded 
item are identical, as well as dealing with censored recurrence times. Applications of such an 
approach to repairable systems under fixed-price maintenance and repair contracts include 
Lugtigheid et al.
56
. However, the existing application provides little practical guidance since 
the chief purpose of using a Cox’s PH model was that of estimating the intensity function of a 
power-law NHPP rather (a practice which can be controversial in the light of the discussion 
in Ascher
27
) than as an autonomous model. Also, no mention of the ‘modified’ Cox model 
which may be necessary when the explanatory variables are time-dependent (and hence the 
‘proportionality’ assumption the PH model relies on no longer holds) is made. In the case 
presented here, both time-dependent and time-independent explanatory variables were 
identified, and this required particular attention to the interpretation of the results of the Cox 
model fitted to the empirical data. 
Finally, the estimation of availability from empirical data appears to be extremely rare, rather, 
most academic works focus on the theoretical refinement of availability modelling and on 
simulation
12
. In any case, availability estimation requires known probability distributions of 
failure and repair times as a starting point. The need to follow one of the few procedures for 
the numerical evaluation of point availability
29
 has diverted the attention towards parametric 
lifetime distribution rather than to models of recurrence data that are deemed appropriate for 
repairable items. Also, such operations as convolution and derivations had to be approached 
pragmatically to avoid introducing mathematical concepts that are seldom applied within the 
scope of the analysis presented in this paper. Visualising empirical data against an estimated 
theoretical point availability function as in Figure 11 is not common practice, and required 
focus on a subset for which failure and repair data matched. In the electricity supply industry 
it is common for companies to report metrics such as the System Average Interruption 
Duration Index (SAIDI) which expresses the average duration of outages experienced per 
customers served during a specified time period
57
. Mielczarski et al.
58
 derive such an index 
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theoretically to determine an optimal inventory policy for transformer assets, by adopting the 
common assumption of a constant failure rate upfront. Since the theoretical availability 
results thus obtained are not linked with empirical data, their usefulness for drawing 
conclusions on real-life problems is limited. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, a strategy for the statistical analysis of field reliability data has been outlined 
and applied to a case study underpinned by real-life data in defence avionics. Some ‘forgotten 
lessons’ in field reliability data analysis have been identified and taken into account 
throughout as a guidance for improving the understanding of reliability baselines. Especially 
for the effective execution of availability-based contracts, field reliability data analysis is an 
essential step towards a defensible attribution of operational unavailable time to the 
organizations involved. However, incumbent practices in reliability engineering seem to 
hinder the analyst’s ability to choose between available modelling options based on an 
intelligent exploration of data ‘in context’. 
The research presented in this paper has devoted particular attention to providing data with 
context. The expected benefit is to allow practitioners to appreciate the differences between 
models that are meant for non-repairable items, such as parametric lifetime distributions, and 
those meant for repairable items that, by contrast, focus on a sequence of times to failures. 
Such aspects as organising data according to an appropriate layout; the preliminary 
exploration of data for trends; and the need to deal with the presence of staggered entries and 
right-censored data have been considered. Such aspects are often taken for granted although 
they can have major repercussions on the models of choice as well as the most adequate 
analytical formulation of such a model. Although it is acknowledge that increasingly 
sophisticated analytical functionalities are offered by reliability engineering software 
packages, it appears that in the implementation of such functionalities common assumptions 
remain largely concealed and hence not questionable by practitioners. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the intent of this research has been to raise awareness about 
the dangers of uncritically accepting modelling assumptions that are most commonly made in 
field reliability data analysis. The most debated options for fitting statistical models to data 
have been discussed pragmatically, and implemented with the aid of open-source software 
and electronic spreadsheets. Strengths and weaknesses have been highlighted as they became 
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evident through the application of each model to the specific case study. The need for 
industrial practice of approaching reliability baselines with more awareness of the diversity of 
methods of analysis available in the literature, rather than chasing some ideally truest, ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution is perhaps most effectively expressed in the words of Evan’s:  
“We all use models all the time. We use them, not because they are great, but in spite of 
their being lousy […] All we can ask of our models in any of these situations is that the 
model we are using be adequate for the purposes at hand”59. 
Even if an appropriate model is selected the uncritical interpretation of the model’s results 
may trigger tension between suppliers, manufacturers, and customers/end users. In the 
context of availability contracting, a superficial interpretation of a model’s outcomes may 
lead to undesirable outcomes from breaches in contract terms and conditions, which can in 
turn lead to litigation. Future research should support a more constructive use of the results 
obtained from field reliability data analysis as a basis on which different stakeholders can 
build through collaboration the necessary agreement underpinning performance and quality 
improvement. 
This research has limitations mainly due the absence of detailed guidance from previous 
applications of models other than those prescribed by the incumbent practices. In the absence 
of such guidance the researchers have experienced difficulties in the identification, 
application and interpretation of models and their analytical formulation that seemed more 
adequate to reflect the context of the data at hand. Examples include the implementation of a 
non-closed form of the equations to estimate a power-law NHPP’s parameters; and the 
difficulties of providing a goodness-of-fit statistic for probability distributions in the presence 
of censored data.  
Another limitation of the analysis is that the focus was deliberately confined on models for 
which guidance on the use of empirical field reliability data commonly gathered by industry 
was available, rather than attempting to comprehensively cover theoretical refinements. As a 
consequence, the approaches presented were almost exclusively time-based.  Although it can 
be argued that a focus on time as the only relevant independent variable in reliability analysis 
is always appropriate, alternative modelling approaches for equipment maintenance support, 
e.g. queue-server discrete event simulations
60
, were not touched here. 
 
 26 
 
It was beyond the scope of this research to employ the models fitted to the data to make 
predictions regarding the case study at hand. As most other words, the statistical analysis of 
field reliability data presented here provides a retrospective analysis of ‘parts that broke’. A 
word of caution seems necessary with regards to drawing conclusions about such a complex 
system as the enterprise executing an availability contract from the analysis in hindsight of 
the some of the physical components involved. As Dekker
61
 has observed, a technology that 
may appear tidy on the drawing board can easily turn out to be unruly once it hits the field, 
thus undermining the predictive power of retrospective analysis. 
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Appendix 
The following subroutines are called in the algorithm shown in Figure 10 and execute the 
approximate derivation of a generic funciton “A” and the Stjelties convolution of two generic 
functions “A” and “B”. The latter’s derivative is called “b”. 
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Table 1: Analytical formulations of availability in the literature 
 
Type of availability 
Recurring formulations of availability 
Analytic expression Parameters involved 
Static 𝐴 =
mean uptime
men uptime +  mean downtime
 Mean Time Between Failures; Mean Time to Repair 
Instantaneous 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑡 = 0 | 𝐶) 
Item state variable 
𝑌𝑡 = {
0, item is in a state to perform at the level required at time 𝑡
1, item is not in a state to perform at the level required at time 𝑡
 
𝐶 = Given conditions under which an item performs at the required level 
Average 𝐴 =
𝐴𝑡1 + 𝐴𝑡2
2
 Instantaneous availability at two consecutive times 𝑡1, and 𝑡2 
Maintenance Free 
Operating Period 
𝐴𝑡1,𝑡2 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑡1,𝑡2 = 0 | 𝐶) 
Item state variable 
𝑌𝑡1,𝑡2 = {
0, item survives over time interval [t1, t2]
1, item does not survive over time interval [t1, t2]
 
𝐶 = Item was in a state of functioning at the start of the period. 
Spare parts 
availability 
𝐴 = 𝑒−𝐾𝜆𝑇 ∑
(− ln 𝑒−𝐾𝜆𝑇)
𝑛
𝑛!
𝑠
𝑛=0
 
Failure rate (λ); repair lead time (T); number of parts of the same type (K) parts 
carried in stock (s) 
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Table 2: Excerpt of the items data-set 
 
Item ID Manufacturing date Date observations terminate Batch 
no 
Customer Start time  [days] End time [days] 
item_001 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T1 Customer_00 0 4307 
item_002 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T1 Customer_00 65 4307 
item_003 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T1 Customer_00 66 4307 
item_004 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T1 Customer_00 104 4307 
item_005 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T1 Customer_00 113 4307 
…   …   …   …   …   …   …   
item_386 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T2 Customer_04 3990 4307 
item_387 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T2 Customer_04 3991 4307 
item_395 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T3 Customer_08 4082 4307 
item_411 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T3 Customer_04 4229 4307 
item_412 xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx T3 Customer_04 4294 4307 
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Table 3: Excerpt of failure events data-set 
 
Event 
record 
Date logged 
(chronological) 
Item ID Material failure 
(module) or NFF 
Phase failure 
occurs 
Batch 
no 
Customer Responsibility Event-per-item 
key 
Recurrence 
time [days] 
Inter-
recurrence 
time [days] 
Censored 
time [days] 
1 xx/xx/xxxx Item_016 mod_05 Production T1 Customer_01 - Item_016_1 244 244  
2 xx/xx/xxxx Item_016 mod_01 Production T1 Customer_01 - Item_016_2 244 0  
3 xx/xx/xxxx Item_060 mod_16 Production T1 Customer_01 - Item_060_1 168 168  
4 xx/xx/xxxx Item_017 mod_02 Production T1 Customer_06 - Item_017_1 426 426  
5 xx/xx/xxxx Item_014 mod_05 Production T1 Customer_02 - Item_014_1 499 499  
6 xx/xx/xxxx Item_014 mod_05 Production T1 Customer_02 - Item_014_2 510 11  
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
  
119 xx/xx/xxxx Item_116 mod_01 In-service T1 Customer_09 - Item_116 1166 1166  
120 xx/xx/xxxx Item_116 mod_02 In-service T1 Customer_02 - Item_116_2 1166 0  
121 xx/xx/xxxx Item_011 NFF Production T1 Customer_02 - Item_011_1 1935 1935  
122 xx/xx/xxxx Item_089 mod_02 In-service T1 Customer_00 - Item_089_1 1401 1401  
123 xx/xx/xxxx Item_138 mod_02 In-service T1 Customer_02 - Item_138_1 970 970 2211 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
…
 
878 xx/xx/xxxx Item_319 mod_02 Production T2 Customer_02 No Item_319_4 771 310 12 
879 xx/xx/xxxx Item_412 mod_10 Production T3 Customer_04 No Item_412_1 4 4 9 
880 xx/xx/xxxx Item_073 mod_02 In-service T1 Customer_01 Yes Item_073_2 3803 3387 7 
881 xx/xx/xxxx Item_331 mod_10 In-service T2 Customer_04 Yes Item_331_1 574 574 3 
882 xx/xx/xxxx Item_224 mod_02 In-service T2 Customer_04 Yes Item_224_2 1594 1352 1 
NFF = No Fault Found 
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Table 4: Excerpt of the repair data-set 
 
Event 
record 
Date recorded 
(chronological) 
Item ID Responsibility Matched  failure 
report date 
Removal date Ship date Repair lead time 
[days] 
Censored time? 
1 xx/xx/xxxx Item_105 Yes xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 4  
2 xx/xx/xxxx Item_195 Yes xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 4  
3 xx/xx/xxxx Item_020 Yes xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 36  
4 xx/xx/xxxx Item_119 Yes xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 6  
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮  ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
122 xx/xx/xxxx Item_159 Yes xx/xx/xxxx  xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 83  
123 xx/xx/xxxx Item_191 Yes xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 645  
124 xx/xx/xxxx Item_289 No xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 46  
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮  ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
670 xx/xx/xxxx Item_294 No NA xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 21  
673 xx/xx/xxxx Item_137 Yes NA xx/xx/xxxx xx/xx/xxxx 4  
674 xx/xx/xxxx Item_232 Yes NA xx/xx/xxxx NA (WIP) 8 Yes 
675 xx/xx/xxxx Item_042 Yes NA NA NA (WIP) 2 Yes 
WIP = Work-in-process; NA = not available 
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Table 5: Excerpt of derived data-set (continues on next page) 
Chronological 
recurrence times 
from a common 
time origin [days] 
Item Status  Item age, or time since new, at recurrence [days] and, in braces, interrecurrence times  [days] Aggregated 
time on 
study   … item_ 
011 
… Item_
014 
… Item_ 
016 
Item_
017 
… Item_
060 
… Item_ 
073 
… Item_ 
089 
… Item_ 
116 
… Item_ 
138 
… Item_ 
224 
… Item_
319 
… Item_
331 
… Item_ 
412 
1 421 Item_ 
016 
1 … 268 … 263 … 244 244 … 19 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 10172 
        
{244} 
                    2 570 Item_ 
060 
1 … 417 … 412 … 393 393 … 168 … 73 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 20593 
           
{168} 
                 3 603 Item_ 
017 
1 … 450 … 445 … 426 426 … 201 … 106 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 23119 
         
{426} 
                   4 657 Item_ 
014 
1 … 504 … 499 … 480 480 … 255 … 160 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 27444 
      
{499} 
                      5 668 Item_ 
014 
1 … 515 … 510 … 491 491 … 266 … 171 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 28355 
      
{11} 
                      ... ...  ...
 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
81 2086 Item_ 
116 
1 … 1933 … 1928 … 1909 1909 … 1684 … 1589 … 1393 … 1166 … 960 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 230205 
                 
{1166} 
           82 2088 item_ 
011 
1 … 1935 … 1930 … 1911 1911 … 1686 … 1591 … 1395 … 1168 … 962 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 230539 
    
{1935} 
                        83 2094 Item_ 1 … 1941 … 1936 … 1917 1917 … 1692 … 1597 … 1401 … 1174 … 968 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 231541 
  
089 
             
{1401} 
             84 2096 Item_ 
138 
1 … 1943 … 1938 … 1919 1919 … 1694 … 1599 … 1403 … 1176 … 970 … 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 231875 
                   
{970} 
         ... ...  ...
 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
620 4295 Item_ 
319 
1 … 4142 … 4137 … 4118 4118 … 3893 … 3798 … 3602 … 3375 … 3169 … 1583 … 771 … 565 … 1 829182 
                       
{310} 
    
 
621 4298 Item_ 1 … 4145 … 4140 … 4121 4121 … 3896 … 3801 … 3605 … 3378 … 3172 … 1586 … 774 … 568 … 4 830268 
  
412 
                         
{4}  
622 4300 Item_ 1 … 4147 … 4142 … 4123 4123 … 3898 … 3803 … 3607 … 3380 … 3174 … 1588 … 776 … 570 … 6 830992 
  
073 
           
{3387} 
              
 
623 4304 Item_ 
331 
1 … 4151 … 4146 … 4127 4127 … 3902 … 3807 … 3611 … 3384 … 3178 … 1592 … 780 … 574 … 10 832440 
                         
{574} 
  
 
624 4306 Item_ 
224 
1 … 4153 … 4148 … 4129 4129 … 3904 … 3809 … 3613 … 3386 … 3180 … 1594 … 782 … 576 … 12 833164 
                     
{1352} 
       ... ...  ...
 
 ..
. 
 ..
.  ..
. 
..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
.  
631 4307 Item_ 
138 
0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … 3810 … 3614 … 3387 … (3181) … 1595 … 783 … 577 … 13  
                   
{2211+} 
   
 
    
 
..
. 
..
. 
 ..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
.  
982 4307 Item_ 0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … 3810 … 3614 … 3387 … 3181 … 1595 … (783) … 577 … 13  
  
319 
                     
{12+} 
    
 
983 4307 Item_ 0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … 3810 … 3614 … 3387 … 3181 … 1595 … 783 … 577 … (13)  
  
412 
                         
{9+}  
984 4307 Item_ 0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … (3810) … 3614 … 3387 … 3181 … 1595 … 783 … 577 … 13  
  
073 
           
{7+} 
              
 
985 4307 Item_ 
331 
0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … 3810 … 3614 … 3387 … 3181 … 1595 … 783 … (577) … 13  
                         {3+}    
986 4307 Item_ 
224 
0 … 4154 … 4149 … 4130 4130 … 3905 … 3810 … 3614 … 3387 … 3181 … (1595) … 783 … 577 … 13  
                     
{1+} 
      
 
                             231279108 
 Numbers in bold appear in Table 4. Status 1 = failure event; 0= observation ceasing events. Numbers in parentheses are items’ ages at observation ceasing events. The symbol “+” denotes times to non-failure (censored times) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Chronological 
recurrence 
times from a 
common time 
origin [days] 
Aggrega
ted 
observa
tion 
time 
No of 
failure 
events 
Risk set 
size 
[items] 
Event-specific explanatory variables   Item-specific explanatory 
variables Module materially failed, or NFF [1 = occurrence] Phase failure 
occurs [1 = 
in-service] 
Responsibi
lity  
[1 = Yes] 
Module
_01 
Module
_02 
Module
_03 
Module
_04 
Module
_05 
Module
_06 
… Module
_16 
… Module
_18 
Module
_19 
NFF Design 
development  
Customer 
1 421  1 60 1 0 0 0 1 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 0 NA 1 01 
  
         
 
         
2 570  2 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 … 1 … 0 0 0 0 NA 1 01 
  
         
 
         
3 603  3 79 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 0 NA 1 06 
  
         
 
         
4 657  4 82 0 0 0 0 1 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 0 NA 1 02 
  
         
 
         
5 668  5 83 0 0 0 0 1 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 0 NA 1 02 
  
  
 
      
 
    
 
    
..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
81 2086  81 167 1 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 1 NA 1 02 
  
         
 
         
82 2088  82 167 0 0 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 1 0 NA 1 00 
  
         
 
         
83 2094  83 167 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 1 NA 1 02 
  
         
 
         
84 2096  84 167 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 1 NA 1 11 
  
  
 
      
 
    
 
    
..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
620 4295  620 362 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 0 0 2 02 
  
         
 
         
621 4298  621 362 0 0 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 1 0 0 0 0 3 04 
  
         
 
         
622 4300  622 362 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 1 1 1 01 
  
         
 
         
623 4304  623 362 0 0 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 1 0 0 1 1 2 04 
  
         
 
         
624 4306  624 362 0 1 0 0 0 0 … 0 … 0 0 0 1 1 2 04 
  
  
 
      
 
    
 
    
..
. 
..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
.  ..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
631 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 1 11 
  
  
 
      
 
    
 
    
..
. 
..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
.   ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
982 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 2 02 
  
         
 
         
983 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 3 04 
  
         
 
         
984 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 1 01 
  
         
 
         
985 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 2 04 
                     
986 4307 833526  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA … NA … NA NA NA NA NA 2 04 
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Table 6: Excerpt of modifications to the item data-set to aid the estimation of a power-law NHPP 
 
Item number (q) 
Start time 
(Sq) 
End time (Tq) 𝐥𝐧𝑺𝒒 𝐥𝐧𝑻𝒒 𝑺𝒒
𝜷∗
 𝑻𝒒
𝜷∗
 𝑻𝒒
𝜷∗
− 𝑺𝒒
𝜷∗
 𝑻𝒒
𝜷∗
𝐥𝐧𝑻𝒒 − 𝑺𝒒
𝜷∗
𝐥𝐧𝑺𝒒 𝑵𝒒 ∑ 𝒍𝒏𝑿𝒊𝒒
𝑵𝒒
𝒊=𝟏
 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
Item_011 153 4307 5.03 8.37 2.42E+04 1.95E+07 1.95E+07 1.63E+08 2 15.82 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
Item_016 177 4307 5.18 8.37 3.24E+04 1.95E+07 1.95E+07 1.63E+08 4 30.07 
Item_017 177 4307 5.18 8.37 3.24E+04 1.95E+07 1.95E+07 1.63E+08 3 21.87 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
Item_060 402 4307 6.00 8.37 1.68E+05 1.95E+07 1.94E+07 1.63E+08 3 22.07 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
Item_224 2712 4307 7.91 8.37 7.73E+06 1.95E+07 1.18E+07 1.02E+08 2 16.35 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
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Table 7: Excerpt of data layout for the computation of non-parametric MCF estimator and its parametric NHPP approximation 
 
Chronological 
recurrence 
times from a 
common time 
origin [days] 
Event occurrence per item q  [1=failure event] 
R
ep
o
rt
ed
 
ev
en
ts
 
Items status [1=observed; 0=not observed] 
R
is
k 
se
t 
Non-parametric fitting 
… item_ 
011 
… Item_016 Item_017 … Item_060 … Item_224 … item_011 … Item_016 Item_017 … Item_060 … Item_224 … MCF 
estim 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
1 421 … 0 … 1 0 … 0 … 0 … 1 1 … 1 1 … 1 … 0 … 60 0.017 -0.016 0.049 
2 570 … 0 … 0 0 … 1 … 0 … 1 1 … 1 1 … 1 … 0 … 76 0.029 -0.011 0.071 
3 603 … 0 … 0 1 … 0 … 0 … 1 1 … 1 1 … 1 … 0 … 79 0.042 -0.005 0.090 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
70 2088 … 1 … 0 0 … 0 … 0 … 1 1 … 1 1 … 1 … 0 … 167 0.603 0.463 0.743 
..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
 ..
. 
..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
. 
..
.  ..
. 
..
.  ..
.  ..
.  ..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
..
. 
475 4306 … 0 … 0 0 … 0 … 1 … 1 1 … 1 1 … 1 … 1 … 362 2.492 2.323 2.661 
476 4307 … 0 … 0 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 0 … 0 0 … 0 … 0 … 0 NA NA NA 
Events per item  
𝑁𝑞  
… 2 … 4 3 … 3 … 2 …               
 
 
 
Table 7 (continued) 
 
Chronological 
recurrence 
times from a 
common time 
origin [days] 
i-th event time per  item q 𝑋𝑖𝑞  and  ln (𝑋𝑖𝑞) in braces Power-law NHPP 
mean value 
funciton 
?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑞
?̂? 
… item_ 
011 
… Item_016 Item_017 … Item_060 … Item_224 … 
1 421 … 0 … 421 0 … 0 … 0 … 0.023 
     {6.04}        
2 570 … 0 … 0 0 … 570 … 0 … 0.043 
        {6.34}     
3 603 … 0 … 0 603 … 0 … 0 … 0.048 
      {6.40}       
..
. 
..
. 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
..
. 
 
 
 
..
. 
 
..
. 
70 2088 … 2088 … 0 0 … 0 … 0 … 0.584 
   {7.64}          
..
. 
..
. 
 ..
. 
 ..
. 
..
. 
 ..
. 
 ..
. 
 ..
. 
475 4306 … 0 … 0 0 … 0 … 4306 … 2.493 
          {8.37}   
476 4307 … 0 … 0 0 … 0 … 0 … NA 
∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑞
𝑁𝑞
𝑖=1
 … 15.82 … 30.07 21.87 … 22.07 … 16.35 … 
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Table 8: Computation of Chi-squared goodness of fit test for the NHPP 
 
Interval j Lower bound 𝑡𝑗 Upper bound 𝑡?̅?  𝑁𝑇𝑗 𝑒𝑗 [𝑁𝑇𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗]
2
𝑒𝑗⁄  
1 0 1716 55 50.672 0.370 
2 1716 3011 141 166.046 3.778 
3 3011 4307 428 407.282 1.054 
   
624 624.000 5.202 
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Table 9: Excerpt of main statistics for the graphical estimation of a Weibull probability density function 
Events 
ranking 
Magnitude-ranked 
inter-recurrence 
times 
Status  
[1 = failure,  
0 = censoring] 
Analytical devices 
Failures at 
each lifetime 
Survivors prior to  
𝑡𝑖  
Hazard Cumulative Hazard 
Function  
Survivor curve estimator Cumulative Density 
Function (CDF) Kaplan-Meier Fleming-
Harrington 
𝑖 𝑡𝑖  𝑛(𝑡𝑖) 𝑟(𝑡𝑖) ℎ(𝑡𝑖) =
𝑛(𝑡𝑖)
𝑟(𝑡𝑖)
 𝐻(𝑡) = ∑
𝑛(𝑡𝑖)
𝑟(𝑡𝑖)
 𝑆(𝑡𝑖) = ∏
𝑟(𝑡𝑖) − 𝑛(𝑡𝑖)
𝑟(𝑡𝑖)
 ?̂?(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝐻(𝑡) 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − ?̂?(𝑡) 
1 1 1 3 986 0.003 0.003 0.997 0.997 0.003 
2 1 1 3 985 0.003 0.006 0.994 0.994 0.006 
3 1+ 0 - 984 - 0.006 0.994 0.994 0.006 
4 3+ 0 - 983 - 0.006 0.994 0.994 0.006 
5 4 1 1 982 0.001 0.007 0.993 0.993 0.007 
6 5 1 2 981 0.002 0.009 0.991 0.991 0.009 
7 5 1 2 980 0.002 0.011 0.989 0.989 0.011 
8 6 1 1 979 0.001 0.012 0.988 0.988 0.012 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
... 
981 3486 1 1 6 0.167 5.460 0.004 0.004 0.996 
982 3535+ 0  5 - 5.460 0.004 0.004 0.996 
983 3585 1 1 4 0.250 5.710 0.003 0.003 0.997 
984 3708 1 1 3 0.333 6.043 0.002 0.002 0.998 
985 3831 1 1 2 0.500 6.543 0.001 0.001 0.999 
986 3920 1 1 1 1.000 7.543  0.001 0.999 
          
The values with “+” are times to non-failure (right-censored times) 
 
 
 
 
 
